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I. Introduction
In the whole of the Middle East, with all of its
complex maze of petroleum concessions, there is only one
company that is completely owned and controlled by American
interests. This company is the Arabian American Oil Company
(Aramco), which is a wholly-owned producing and refining
subsidiary of four major American oil companies. From its
meager beginning in the 1930's, it has had a startling
growth. Since the end of the last war, it has become the
single largest oil-producing company in the world. Aramco
is located in Saudi Arabia, which is in one of the strategic
areas of the world. Therefore, Aramco occupies a critical
position in world affairs by virtue of the importance of
petroleum products, the relative size of Aramco, and its
location in a strategic area. In 1950, the parent companies
of Aramco completed construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipe
Line, which is the world's largest crude oil pipe line.
It traverses the desert in Northern Saudi Arabia and connects
the producing oil fields of Aramco to the port of Sidon on
the Mediterranean Sea. This pipeline relieved sixty-five
critically-needed tankers from the 7,000 mile round trip
around the Arabian Peninsula. The purpose of this paper
is to trace the development of Aramco and, also, to determine
what effect, if any, Tapline would have on the distribution
and price of the crude oil produced by Aramco.
Since Tapline was not completed until 'December of 1950,
it only left two years in which to judge the effect of Tapline.
Because of the slowness of the various countriesin reporting
their trade statistics, figures were unavailable for the 1952
petroleum imports of most of Aramco's usual outlets. This
effectively left only the 1951 figures for consideration.
And the year 1951 turned out to be a rather poor criterion
for any long-range trend. It was the first year of operation
which implies that Aramco did not have sufficient time to
adjust to its use even if normal times prevailed. Secondly,
the petroleum trade pattern was still in a period of transition
from the last war, and the Korean War started in July 1950,
which undoubtedly had some effect on the usual trade pattern.
Thirdly, and perhaps most important, was the Iranian nationaliza-
tion of their petroleum resources and facilities. Iranian oil
had previously been the largest Middle East oil producer. There-
fore, when its petroleum was removed from the world trade, it
left many deficit areas. Other companies consequently increased
their production far above their normal operations in order
to supply the deficit areas. This increase was far out of
proportion with usual conditions and this was reflected in
the world trade pattern. The combination of these various
factors made the restlts obtained very inconclusive.
In regard to the price pattern, Tapline has had very
little, if any, effect on the crude prices paid by the con-
sume:'s. It has increased the profit of the parent companies
(2.)
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because its operation costs are much lower than the tanker
rates which still remain as the basic factor in determining
the delivered price of the crude. The net result of the
paper is that Tapline has had an inconclusive effect on the
trade pattern and practically no effect upon the price
structures. It will probably not have any appreciable effect
until more pipe lines are constructed to the Mediterranean.
(4.)
II. Saudi Arabia
If one individual had to be named that was most
responsible for the current state of affairs on the Arabian
Peninsula, the choice would unquestionably fall to the
Saudi Arabian monarch, King Ibn Saud. He alone was re-
sponsible for uniting the various territories into a united
country which, in turn, permitted him to award the petroleum
concessions to American corporations. He maintains the
harmony that'has existed thus far between the Saudi Arabian
government, the people, and Aramco. Without him, there are
an unlimited number of possibilities of conditions that could
now exist in Arabia and, probably, the entire Middle East.
Perhaps the area would still be inhabited by various warring
factions that could have greatly hindered the petroleum
developments that have progressed so far. It is also possible
that the area could have been put under the rule of some
person or country that -had aims that~were opposed or not in
accordance with those of the United States. Not only has
he been very influential in petroleum affairs but, also,
Middle East affairs that' could have otherwise added some
very sore headaches to a world that already has more than
its share of trouble spots. He has been a staunch ally of
the United States, and--in spite of his somewhat dictatorial
form of government and many of the customs and practices
that he encourages or tolerates, which are naturally re-
pugnant to our way of life--the American public is very
lucky that such a man as Ibn Saud has and does exist. Since
(5.)
Aramco's history and Saudi Arabia's history have progressed
concurrently and are largely dependent upon the life of Ibn
Saud, a short review is necessary to completely understand
the current situation of Aramco.
For many centuries, the basic unit of government
on the Arabian Peninsula was the tribe with rule centered in
the tribal chieftain. The country was divided into four more
or less independent kingdoms, each of which maintained some
measure of control over the tribes within their borders.
This whole area was loosely a part of the old Ottoman Empire,
and the tribal chieftains gave varying degrees of allegiance
to the Sultan of Turkey. Ibn Saud was born in 1880 in Riyadh,
where his father--at the time--was the ruler of Nejd, a large
area in central Arabia. While Ibn Saud was a boy, his father's
province was conquered by the Rashidi, forcing Ibn Saud's
family into exile. When he was twenty-one (1901), Ibn Saud
started his conquest which led to the present Saudi Arabian
kingdom. He organized a small force and conquered Riyadh,
driving out the Rashidi. After a series of campaigns against
the Rashidi and the Turks, Ibn Saud became complete master of
the Nejd by the end of 1906. Another campaign against the
Turks on the eastern coast brought the large province of
Hasa under his rule in 1913. During World War I, the British--
through the exploits of the legendary Colonel Lawerence--aided
one of Ibn Saud's rival chieftains to drive the Turks out of
Hejaz, a west coast province containing the Holy cities of
Mecca and Medina. By 1924, Ibn Saud had driven this British-
sponsored chieftain out of Hejaz. In the following two years,
(6.)
Ibn Saud waged several other small campaigns and completed
his conquest over the territory that was named Saudi Arabia
1.
in 1932 in Ibn Saud's honor.
Because of his exploits in unitihg the various
territories into one integrated country, Ibn Saud became
the most powerful and influential ruler in the Middle East
and was known as the "Son of the Desert."' He was influential
enough to set up his own form of government which, at first
glance, appears to be an absolute monarchy. However, Ibn
Saud himself is very religious and belongs to the strictest
sect of the Islam religion. Therefore, Ibn Saud and his gov-
ernment are supposedly bound by the scriptures from the Koran,
which is the Bible of Islam religion. He is guided in his
interpretation of the scriptures by a council of religious
elders called the Ulama. On matters not covered by Koranic
law, the king makes his own rules. The four former kingdoms
are now the four provinces of Nejd, He.jaz, Hasa, and Asir.
Each of these provinces are now governed by a viceroy appointed
by the king. Two of these viceroys are sons of the king (he
had 32 sons at last count), and the other two are relatives
of the king. The cities and villages are governed by amirs,
who act both as administrators and judges. Since the basis of
the legal system is the Koranic law, the theologians play an
important part in assisting and advising the governors in
legal and judicial matters. Western democratic institutions
are practically unknown; consequently, justice in Saudi Arabia
2.
is rather harsh by American standards. For example, the crime
1. K. S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia (Princeton, N. J., The Prince-
ton University Press, 1947), pp. 156 f.
2. Op. Cit., pp. 162 f.
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of stealing is punishable by cutting off a hand. An interesting
contrast between the American and Arab viewpoints is shown by
the fact that the Arabs consider our means of punishment by
confinement almost unbearably cruel. So, all in all, the
government under Ibn Saud is more of a theocracy than an ab-
solute monarchy. However, Ibn Saud is growing old and is
handicapped by old battle wounds which means that Saudi Arabia
will have a new ruler in the near future. The heir apparent,
Prince Saud, lacks his father's warlike background and, when
he becomes the ruler, it is doubtful that he will be able to
retain the same degree of respect and obedience that his father
has commanded from his tribal chieftains. So, many Middle East
authorities and Aramco officials are quite worried about the
complex, and perhaps disastrous, situation that may arise after
the powerful Ibn Saud's death. Although it is rather certain
that Prince Saud strongly desires to maintain the friendly
ties that now link Aramco and Saudi Arabia, it is quite un-
certain whether or not he can retain the same degree of unity
and loyalty among his subordinate tribal chieftains. This
means that the present Aramco and Tapline owners could lose
part or all of their large investment in Saudi Arabia.
Today, the present kingdom of Saudi Arabia covers
almost the entire portion of the Arabian Peninsula and is
approximately one-fourth the size of the United States. It
consists mostly of stepnes and deserts similar to the terrain
found in Arizona and Nevada. During the last ten years, Saudi
Arabia has been an excellent example of a country whose living
and economic conditions have had to make the transition from
0
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1950 B.C. to 1950 A.D. within a span of a few short years.
A few years ago, this country was almost completely isolated
from any contact with the Western World, and the sudden intro-
duction of a large modern petroleum enterprise into a primitive
desert community has had far-reaching repercussions upon the
economic and social life of the inhabitants. This sudden
transition has caused many difficult and deversified problems
for Aramco officials. The three major problems encountered
were: the total lack of any technical training of the Arabs;
the complete lack of any modern facilities, accentuated by the
type of terrain and climate where major operations are located;
the primitive financial system of the country, coupled with
the Arab's distrust of modern banking techniques.
When Aramco first arrived in Saudi Arabia, the company
had to draw as much of its personnel as possible from the
people of the country for reasons of practical necessity as
well as political expediency. The difficulty was that the
Arabs only knew the ways of the camel; they knew almost nothing
about machinery. Very few natives had any kind of formal
education, and even truck drivers were very scarce. Aramco
has tried to offset this obstacle through a unique training
program; meanwhile using Americans and people of other
nationalities for jobs that the Saudi Arabs are not yet
qualified to hold. The company has about 14,000 Saudi Arabs
on its payroll, not counting those employed by contractors
doing work for the company. When first employed, 88% of
the Saudi workers are illiterate and only .n insinificant
number have any technical experience at all. After the-new
(9.)
employee is given an aptitude test, he is given ninety days
of pre-job training. After being assigned to a specific job,
the Arab continues his training by'devoting one hour out of
each eight working hours to learning new skills that will
3.
qualify him for more snecialized and better paying positions.
Some of these trainees have moved up to become foremen and
supervisors; a very small number-have moved up to senior staff
status. Aramco encouraged other skilled workers to auit the
company and enter into business for themselve-s. The Arab
Industrial Development Department was established for this
purpose. The system has worked out surprisingly well, and
today Aramco deals with several hundred independent Arab
contractors. Some contractors have grown enough to start
corporations. Most of them are engaged in goods and services
enterprises.
However, only a minute part of the total population
of around four million people work directly or indirectly for
the company. The major part of the population consists of
wandering tribes, whose occupation is tending herds of camels,
sheep and goats. In the towns (which are generally located on
the oasis), production and trade are carried on in much the same
way as they were in medieval times. The townspeople are
principally merchants, artisans, and gardeners who work in
nearby fields. The cultivatable land around the oasit towns ia
largely owned by a few wealthy landholders whno rent the fields--
usually for a fixed amount of the produce. The most important
3. New York Herald Tribune, May 4, 1952, Editorial page.
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professional class is the religious teachers, who conduct
services in the mosques and have certain judicial functions
under Moslem law. Before the advent of the oil industry,
there was no middle class; just sheiks and rich merchants,
on one hand, and town slum-dwellers, on the other. But since
the oil operations have started, a middle class--based on
4.
industry--has begun to grow up.
The second problem of lack of modern facilities means,
primarily, the lack of any adequate transportation means in the
form of highways, automotive equipment, railroads, and sea port
facilities. When Aramco first started operations in Saudi Arabia,
there were no railroads; only one major highway; and only two
seaports, which were located where Aramco could not fully
utilize them. Because of these conditions and the nature of
Saudi Arabia's terrain, Aramco has developed the largest air
transport system operated by any private comrpny, with the ex-
5.
ception of me jor :ir transport companies. Some of these
transportation problems will be seen more clearly during the
descripntion of Ararmco operations, because the introduction of
petroleum and its consequent huge royalties have done much to
improve and expand the existing transportation facilities.
For a country whose ancestors invented the wheel and
first developed the use of Arabic numbers, their descendents--
through the centuries--have fallen far below the traditional
high standards. Much of the blame for this condition may be
4. Twitchell, op.cit., p. 171.
5. New York Herald Tribune, May 4, 1952, Editorial page.
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attributed to the newness of the unity and government of the
country. The other major cause is the almost total lack of
minerals and raw materials (except petroleum), which has
deprived the country of any type of industrial development.
The only other exploitation of the country's mineral resources
is also carried out by a foreign-owned company. In 1932, gold
was discovered about 250 miles north of Jidda and the govern-
ment granted a concession to the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate
to discover and develop all of the mineral wealth of the
country except oil. The Saudi Arabian Government owns about
15% of the shares and, in addition, receives 5% royalties.
Saudi Arab nationals own about 10% of the shares. The remaining
75% is equally divided between private companies from the
United States, Great Britain, and Canada. About one million
dollars' worth of gold concentrates plus small amounts of
silver, lead, and copper are produced annually. However, the
ore that is mined is of such a complicated nature that it must
be shipped to the United States for separation since Saudi
Arabia does not have the extensive facilities necessary for
6.
the separation process. This lack of any industrial develop-
ment has naturally had many dire consequences besides those
already mentioned. Chief of these affecting Aramco operations
to a large extent is the antiquated monetary system. The
Saudi Arabian Government not only does not publish any type
of budget but does not even prepare one. It has very few, if
any, statistics about its foreign or domestic trade, and it
does not even have a first approximation of its own population
6. Twitchell, op.cit., p. 174.
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figures (estimates range from three to six million). This
indifference has symbolized the attitude of the government
since its inception until a year or so ago. Aramco and
United States officials have finally persuaded the government
to let U.S. experts analyze their position and make recom-
mendations to enable Saudi Arabia to keep abreast of the
changes that the petroleum discovery has caused. Gradually,
the government has started practicing modern budgetary, tax,
and control systems. All changes in the monetary system
will have to be slow, because of the distrustful attitude of
any form of paper currency by both the Arab and the government.
Until recent times, there has never been any type of paper
currency on the Arabian Peninsula. The typical Arab leads
a nomadic life and has very little savings except his material
possessions. Therefore, the Arab naturally prefers a metallic
currency of small value. Under the present government, the
official medium of exchange is the silver riyal. Its value
is the bullion value of silver, which fluctuates around $0.25.
However, the traditional and de facto monetary standard is the
English gold sovereign. In New York, the bullion value of the
sovereign is $8.24, but around the Middle East its value varies
in the wide range of $12.00 to $20.00. These large fluctuations
have caused some serious problems for Aramco--with both the
Saudi Arabian and United States Governments. Also, because
of the lack of paper currency, Aramco is given another head-
ache by having to make all payroll and royalty payments by the
very inconvenient method of large quantities of coins. Aramco
must constantly employ a large transport plane to fly to different
(13.)
countries to buy planeloads of sovereigns in order to meet
these large transactions. To increase the difficulties,
there are only two banks in Saudi Arabia, both located at
Jidda--across the country from Aramco's main headquarters.
One bank is British and the other is Dutch. The government,
because of its distrust of banks, hardly used.the banking
facilities at all until recent years. But now that Aramco
has thrown the country into a large number of international
monetary dealings which have complex financial structures,
the government has been forced into relying more and more upon
the banking procedures. In addition, the government has
financed a large amount of internal improvements from its
huge oil royalties, which have also helped point out the
weaknesses of their financial system. So the government has
become convinced of the necessity of a financial revolution.
All that remains is to change the ideas of the unchanging
Arabs and develop the best possible system to obtain a smoothly
functioning economy.
From the foregoing brief description of Saudi Arabia,
it is hoped that one can see the major obstacles of the country
which Aramco has had to overcome and must still contend with--
in addition to its primary aim of producing and distributing
its final petroleum products. The other problems will be
brought out more clearly in the following chapter, which is
devoted mainly to Aramco's development.
(14.)
III. Aramco and Tapline Development
The entire Middle East has been embroiled in a cycle
of development all its own since the beginning of known
history. Centuries ago, it was one of the major centers of
knowledge, mystery, and riches. While other parts of the
world began their industrial and intellectual development,
the Middle East lapsed into a degenerate atmosphere until it
finally became one of the most underdeveloped regions of the
world. But around the turn of the twentieth century, the
discovery of petroleum ironically, or perhaps fortunately,
turned this area into one of the most strategic and controversial
areas in the world. Under these conditions, Aramco had its
meager beginnings in the newly-formed kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The development of the various petroleum concessions,
and the extremely complex corporate structure that resulted,
is given in great detail in many different sources. However,
in this paper only a very brief ricture will be presented of
the petroleum developments prior to the advent of Aramco
operations. Around the turn of the century, the Americans, in
general, felt quite secure about the petroleum resources
located within our sphere of influence; consequently, foreign
petroleum operations were almost wholly initiated and developed
by countries other than the United States. Gradually, the
Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Persian Oil Company emerged as
the chief controlling companies outside of the United States.
It wasn't until after World War I that American companies began
taking an active interest in foreign operations. There were
(15.)
several motivating factors behind our change of policy: the
most important factor was the reports which predicted our own
possible shortages of reserves within the near future, the
fear that the British and Dutch would soon develop into an
impregnable empire excluding any future possible American
entrance, and the anxiety over the possible loss of the
Mexican concessions. However, the American oil interests
had waited too late for the Dutch and British concerns were
already firmly entrenched in the then known foreign'oil
deposits. Because of the American government's fear of our
own dwindling reserves, our government took radical steps
with the other governments in order to obtain equal oppor-
tunity for the American companies in foreign operations.
Although our fear concerning our oil reserves proved ground-
less, it served as a good incentive to make the government
and the major oil companies cooperate in obtaining equal
rights for American companies abroad. The final result was
that American oil interests acquired wide exrloration and
development rights in the Middle East and the Indies. Sus-
picions of the existence of an oil monopoly from which the
United States was excluded gradually subsided, and the large
international oil companies of all nationalities gradually
7.
drew together in a network of agreements. When the American
companies entered the Middle East, they acouired a total of
23 3/4% interest in the Iraq Petroleum Comnany. At this time,
the IPC only held the East Tigris concession, so the famous
Red Line Agreement was adopted, and all participants in the
IPC were bound by this pact. This pact, primarily, pledged
7. Feis, Herbert, Petroleum and American Foreign Policy, (Food
Research Institute, Stanford University, Calif., March, 1944),
p. 11.
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each participant not to undertake independently any oil
developments within what is known as the Red Line Area.
This area included all of Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine,
Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey both in Europe and in Asia Minor,
and the Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf with the exception of
8.
Kuwait., Although this agreement is no longer recognized,
at the time it was regarded as a useful and necessary measure
to forestall over-zealous competition among the IPC partici-
pants for oil concessions.
The initial Saudi Arabain concession was hinged quite
closely with the concessions obtained and developed on Bahrein
Island, a small island just off the eastern coast of the
Arabian Peninsula. In 1927, an Englishman named Frank Holmes
obtained a concession in Bahrein Island and Saudi Arabia
because of doing some previous drilling for water there.
Holmes transferred the Bahrein concession to the Gulf Oil
Corporation in 1928 and let the Saudi Arabian concession expire.
However, Gulf--at the time--was a stock-holder in the IPC and,
therefore, subject to the Red Line Agreement. The IPC felt
that the geologic structure of Bahrein was unfavorable to the
discovery of oil and Gulf was required to transfer this con-
cession. So the Bahrein concession, in 1928, was transferred
to the Standard Oil Company of California, which was not then
0.
subject to the Red Line Agreement. Since Bahrein was a British
8. Arabian American Oil Company, Middle East Oil Developments,
(New York: 1952), p. 8.
9. Ibid, p. 8.
(17.)
Protectorate, Standard of California was required to obtain
the approval of the British Government. Consequently, the
Bahrein Petroleum Company that was formed as a subsidiary
10.
of Standard of California was -incorporated in Canada. The
Bahrein Company begar explorations immediately and discovered
oil in 1932. From this point, it 'is not quite certain how
Standard of California obtained the concession in Saudi'Arabia.
The International Petroleum Cartel ReLort claims there was
intense competition between Standard of California and the
IPC for the concession in Saudi Arabia after the oil discovery
11.
in nearby Bahrein. However, Karl Twitchell, a mining engineer
who was a close friend of Ibn Saud, maintains that he approached
American members of the IPC during this period and could not
even interest them in acquiring exploration rights in Saudi
Arabia. He finally acted as an agent for Standard of California,
who seemed to be the only American company interested in Saudi
12.
Arabia. At any rate, Standard of California obtained the
concession from Ibn Saud, and the subsidiary California Arabian
American Oil Company was formed as a Deleware corporation in
December 1933. The American incorporation wps possible because
Ibn Saud had broken all ties with the British by treaties made
in 1927. Although the exact circumstances surroinding Ibn
Saud's granting the concession to Standard of California are
somewhat vague, it is definitely known that he was partial to
the American interests. His previous encounters with the
10. U.S. Congress, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission,
submitted to the Select Committee on Small Business, U.S.
Senate, The International Petroleum Cartel, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 74.
11. Ibid, p. 75.
12. K.S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1953), pp. 148 ff.
(18. )
British during his desert campaigns; the unhappy failure of
the previous concession with a British citizen; and the
knowledge of how the British had interferred with the internal
affairs of other oil-rich countries--these three factors
definitely influenced Ibn Saud against any British company
or any company in which the British were major participants,
such as the IPC. Standard of California was the only other
major company not embroiled in any far-reaching agreements
with the British companies, so this company received the
oprortunity to commence operations and progress along with
the newly-consolidated country. The concession granted to
the wholly-owned California Arabian Standard Oil Company
covered approximately 360,000 square miles, an area comparable
in size to the States of Oregon and Washington. The concession
was to run for 60 years and, in addition, the company was given
preferential rights to acquire additional oil concessions in
Saudi Arabia by meeting the terms of any other offers made to
the government. There were other arrangements for the company
payments of royalties, loans, gifts, etc., and the company
was also required to build a small refinery to supply local
13.
needs.
The company started exploration in 1934, but other
events led to a merger with the Texas Company. In 1935, Standard
of California built a refinery on Bahrein Island to refine the
crude oil that was produced on the island. Prior to this,
Standard of California was mostly a domestic company and had
relied upon the foreign marketing facilities of Sacony-Vacuum
13. The International Petroleum Cartel, on.cit., p. 116.
(19.)
for all of its foreign distribution. Consequently, the
California company had not developed any marketing facilities
that could handle its refined products that were now coming
mostly from the Middle East instead of the United States.
Also, the exploration in Saudi Arabia was turning out to be
rather discouraging, and the California company was getting
involved in some hoavy expenditures to the Saudi Arabian
government. The Texas Company was, at this time, another
major petroleum company that was not restricted or hindered
by the Red Line Agreement. It had no large source of crude
oil in the Middle East, but it had large marketing facilities
both in the European and the Far East areas. Thus, a perfect
merger was indicated with one company having the source of
crude oil and the other company having excellent marketing
facilities. Two separate and independent agreements were
consummated within such a short period of time that they appear
as one. The first agreement, primarily, gave the Texas Company
one-half interest in the Bahrein concession and its facilities.
It gave Standard of California one-half interest in all of
Texas Company's marketing facilities that were East of the
Suez Canal in which to market its Bahrein products. Thus, a
marketing subsidiary of the Bahrein Petroleum Company was
formed that was called California-Texas Oil Company, Ltd.
(Caltex) and was incorporated in the Bahama Islands. This
consolidation occurred in July 1936, at which time oil develop-
ments were still not looking too good in Saudi Arabia. However,
after this first merger was made, a well was drilled in Saudi
Arabia that looked like it might have future commercial
(20.)
possibilities. So, a supplemental agreement was made in the
form of a three-year option in the case of Saudi Arabia. The
Texas Company was to receive half interest in the California
Arabian Oil Company and Standard of California, in turn, was
to receive a half interest in the European marketing facilities
14.
of the Texas Company. These two different mergers now show
the following picture: Standard of California and the Texas
Company each control one-half interest in the two subsidiary
producing companies--Bahrein Petroleum Company and the California-
Arabia Oil Company. In addition, they each'own and control half
of the California-Texas Oil Company, Ltd., which is solely a
marketing company with facilities in Europe, Africe, and the
area East of the Suez.
In 1938, the first successful well was drilled in the
Daman area, which indicated vast commercial possibilities.
This discovery virtually started an "oil rush" to Saudi Arabia.
The axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan--along with the
IPC--were the major contenders for other concessions in Saudi
Arabia. Although Japan offered much more attractive financial
arrangements, Ibn Saud still preferred the American company,
primarily because of their friendly relationships and the fact,
that the German and Japanese companies were not private companies,
15.
but were government controlled. In addition to its previous
concession, the California-Arabian Company added about 80,000
square miles to its original concession, bringing its total -
14. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before a Special Committee
Investigating the National Defense Program, Petroleum
Arrangements with Saudi Arabia, Part 41, Extending Senate
Resolution 71, 80th. Congress, 1st Session (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 24836 f.
15. L.M. Fanning, American Operations Abroad, (New York and
London: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1947), p. 93.
_ _ - A
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concession area to 440,000 square miles. It also received
preferential rights in the disputed area called the Kuwait-
Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone. The concession was again extended
60 years to 1999, and the prevailing Middle East royalty rate
of four shillings per ton ($0.22 per barrel at the international
exchange rates) was continued. Also, there were other payments
and financial arrangements made with the government. Latpr,
the option of the California-Texas merger became a permanent
agreement with additional financial transactions between the
two parent companies.
After the initial discovery, exploration continued at
a rapid rate, which discovered three major fields by the start
of World War II in 1941. During this period, a small refinery
with a capacity of 3,000 barrels per day was built at Ras
Tanura to supply local needs. The rest of the crude oil was
shipped to Bahrein Island to be refined and marketed by the
Caltex Company.
During the period 1933 to 1941, the company had invested
$27,500,000 in the Saudi Arabia operations, in addition to an
advance of *6,800,000 to Ibn Saud to be applied against future
16.
royalties. For this huge investment, the company had received
very little in the way of compensation and were now faced with
global war. Mr. Moffet, president of Caltex at that time, said
that the California-Arabian Company could have produced from
100,000 to 200,000 barrels per day, but they were restricted
in production because there was no available outlet for Arabian
16. Hearings before a Special Committee Investigating the
National Defense Program, Part 41, o-p.cit., p. 24725.
WON-
(22.)
17.
oil. Mr. Moffet blamed this lack of markets on the cartel
arrangements that were then in existence between the major
international oil companies. Mr. Moffet made this statement
in 1947, during a period in which he was suing the parent
companies for a substantial sum of money for past services
rendered. Mr. Moffet maintained that this cartel arrangement
was the reason that the oil companies had to approach the
U.S. Government for various types of aid. The company officials
make no direct reply to Mr. Moffet's statement, but they say
they approached the U.S. Government for the purpose of selling
oil to the Navy and to obtain aid for Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud,
at the time, was still undergoing growing pains, and his chief
means of revenue came from the annual pilgrimmages of Moslems
to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. This revenue was now
cut off because of the war, and Ibn saud naturally turned to
the oil company for additional loans to be repaid by future
deductions from the expected royalties. Because of their
already heavy investment and no immediate prospects for mar-
keting their oil, the California-Arabian Company could not
obtain the financial resources to lend Ibn Saud the thirty
million dollars that he needed to offset his budget losses.
For a complete understanding of California-Arabian's problem
during this period, it is necessary to review the international
situation in the Middle East at that time. Although the United
States was not yet officially at war, the British had their
backs against the wall in North Africa. The Germans had the
17. Ibid, p. 24714.
(23.)
advantage at the time, and Britain needed any and all types
of aid. The Middle East was in a very strategic position at
the British rear. Although the Middle East in general was
still neutral, it was considered an extreme "hot spot" which
could sway to either side. Into this picture, the California-
Arabian Company had severel choices of action. First, it could
try to raise the necessary large funds itself to protect its
previous large investment. There would be a considerable risk
involved even excluding the problem of selling the oil. There
was a good possibility that Saudi Arabia could be split by
internal revolt or that the country would be captured or become
a German ally or that the company's present equipment be totally
or partially distroyed by the ravages of war. Secondly, they
could accept Britain's proposal of lending the money to Ibn
Saud from the lend lease aid that the U.S. had given to Britain.
This was a critical neriod for the British, and they wanted the
Saudi Arabian question favorably settled as soon as possible.
However, if the British received the credit for this loan, which
was essentially U.S. money, the British prestige would be con-
siderably strengthened in the one major country of the Middle
East which was now relatively free of the British influence.
If Britain obtained too much prestige in Saudi Arabia, this
could possibly put Saudi Arabia solidly in the Sterling Bloc
and effect a considerable loss to the American parent companies.
Thirdly, the company could try to arrange some financial agree-
ments between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Government.
Obviously, it would be much to the advantage of the
parent comoanies to follow the latter course. Because of this
(24.)
decision, the company officials became deeply involved in
Washington politics and this situation has increased with the
years. Conferences were held with President Roosevelt on
down the chain of command. In general, the rarent companies
tried to persuade the U.S. to lend the thirty million dollars
to Saudi Arabia over a period of five years under the auspices
of the Lend Lease Act. In return, the oil company would repay
the government by selling the U.S. Navy a specified amount of
products refined at Bahrein for extremely low prices. In spite
of all the pressure by the parent companies and the generally
favorable attitude of the U.S. officials, the arrangements never
materialized due to some technicalities in the Lend Lease Act.
Consequently, the affair was partially ended by having Britain
direct ten million dollars of its Lend Lease to Saudi Arabia.
The British succeeded in opening a bank in Saudi Arabia, but
its consequences were not as bad as the retroleum companies had
18.
feared.
During this period of negotiations, the California-
Arabian Oil Company changed its name to the Arabian American
Oil Company for psychological reasons. It became the first
company in the Middle East to put the name of the producing
country first. In the early part of 1943, Aramco finally
succeeded in its negotiations with the U.S. Government. The
U.S. lent Saudi Arabia eighteen million dollars (today it is
labeled "unrecoverable") under the Lend Lease Act and sub-
stantailly the same agreement as previously proposed between
the U.S. and Aramco was confirmed. However, at this time,
18. Ibid, pp. 24836 ff.
(25.)
Aramco was in a better bargaining position then previously
because of the critical petroleum supply; so the price of the
19.
refined products were much higher.
In the latter part of 1943, the U.S. Government tried
to buy a controlling interest (51%) in the stock of Aramco
similar to that of the British government owning controlling
stock in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Comrany. However, there was so
much opposition to this proposal from the oil industry and
government officials that the negotiations were abruptly
20.
dropped. Immediately after these negotiations, discussions
for a proposed pipe line from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern
Mediterranean were started between Aramco and the government;
thus, the stormy history of Tapline was started. Many different
proposals were studied regarding some type of government owner-
ship or options and financial aid. At the time, the estimated
cost of building Tapline was 100-120 million dollars. Because
of this huge investment, the critical tanker shortage, and the
U.S. Government's desire for an absolute source of supply at
rates cheaper than the world price--Aramco and the government
were both very eager to conclude an agreement. The most popular
proposal involved the government lending or subsidizing the
necessary funds for the projected pipeline. In return, the
government would receive first call on a billion barrels of
the crude reserve at a cheaper rate than the prevailing price.
In addition, the government wanted to operate the pipeline as
19. Ibid, p. 24871.
20. Ibid, p. 24871.
(26.)
21.
a common carrier as it is done in the United States. These
proposals concerning the entry of the government into-private
industry engaged in foreign operations was naturally a very
controversial subject. The proponents argued that some type
of government participation would give a semi-official status
to the concession by displaying the fact that our government
regarded this source of supply as a military reserve. This
should discourage unfriendly intrigues and help stabilize
Ibn Saud's government by discouraging local inpulsive disorders.
Also, the American government wouldn't be so deeply committed
as to have to support the company if it was wrong or made a
mistake. The opponents advanced all of the traditional argu-
ments of government favoritism and participation in private
industry. They also argued that the government would have an
inflexible obligation to protect a private property with all
of the possible international problems that could arise. Again,
the opponents of any such merger between private industry and
the government had their way, so the Tapline project was left
to the parent companies of Aramco alone. In conjunction with
the above proposals, there was also an attempt made to obtain
aid from the U.S. Government in order to build a small refinery
at Ras Tanura. This proposal was also turned down for essentially
the same reasons as the pipeline. In spite of this additional
refusal, Aramco began construction work and completed the
refinery in 1945 at a cost of $50,000,000. It had a capacity
of 50,000 barrels per day and produced diesel and fuel oil
22.
primarily for military purposes.
21. Ibid, p. 24871.
22. Ibid, p. 24882.
(27.)
After the war, a series of events occurred that still
have obscure explanations. In December 1946, an engineering
survey was started across the Arabian desert for the construction
of Tapline. This pipeline would connect the gathering facilities
in Eastern Saudi Arabia to the port of Sidon, Lebanon on the
Eastern Mediterranean. This would save the twenty-day, 7200
mile, round-trip from Ras Tanura through the Suez Canal to the
Mediterranean Sea, thereby relieviig 65 critically needed
tankers. It was a vast project, and the estimated cost was
170 million dollars. Prior to this, in mid-1946, Jersey
Standard and Socony-Vacuum started discussions with the Texas
Company and California Standard concerning a joint merger in
23.
Aramco and Tapline. Different groups connect different reasons
for this merger, and the answer probably lies in a combination
of the various factors. The formal agreement was not worked
out and signed until March 12, 1947, and it was contingent upon
the outcome of decisions concerning Jersey and Socony-Vacuum
narticipation in the declining Red Line Agreement. The Federal
Trade Commission contends that the major reason was the "as is"
agreements between the international companies which prohibits
the disruption of the existing distribution pattern. Also, that
Aramco was compelled to admit Jersey Standard and Socony-Vacuum
to obtain additional market outlets for the Arabian oil This
would increase Arabian production and royalties to Ibn Saud,
24.
which would stabilize the Arabian concession. Aramco officials
give a different version: they maintin that there was a shortage
of mrketing facilities, if anything, and not marketing outlets
23. The International Petroleum Cartel, op.cit., p. 120.
24. Ibid, p. 121.
(28.)
because demand for oil at the time was far above any possible
oil production. They said that tie major reason was financial
and the two parent companies felt they were carrying an ex-
cessive risky investment in an area of extreme political
unrest--namely, the growing Arab-Israel problem. In fact,
Mr. Rodgers, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Texas
Company, testified that there wouldn't have been any sale of
Aramco stock if the parent companies had known beforehand that
the Truman Doctrine would be extended to Greece and Turkey.
The Truman Doctrine regarding Greece and Turkey was announced
a few days after the Aramco sale in 1947. Apparently, the two
parent companies associated the extension of this doctrine very
intimately with the protection of the oil reserves in the Middle
East. This doctrine was the first outstanding recognition of
25.
our interest in the Middle East in a very substantial way.
The agreement signed in 1947 contained the following seven
26.
agreements:
(a.) Loan Guaranty Agreements whereby Jersey and
Socony guaranteed payment of a $102,000,000 loan, which
Aramco was obtaining from a group of banks for the con-
struction of Tapline.
(b.) Stock redistribution of Aramco as follows:
California Standard, The Texas Company, and Jersey Standard
each with 30 per cent; Socony-Vacuum with the remaining
10 per cent.
(c.) Same stock redistribution in Tapline.
25. Hearings before a Special Committee Investigating the
National Defense Program, Part 41, p.cit., p. 25289.
26. The International Petroleum Cartel, op.cit., p. 120.
(29.)
(d.) Pipeline agreements between Tapline and the
parent companies.
(e.) Interim off-take agreement between Jersey,
Socony, Caltex, and Aramco.
(f.) Permanent off-take agreement.
(g.) Agreement between Jersey, Socony, and Aramco
regarding the settlement of a gold royalty problem with
the Saudi Arabian Government.
After the conditional Aramco agreement was signed (the
agreement became permanent the following year after a favorable
decision was obtained regarding the Red Line restrictions), the
parent companies of Aramco began work on the projected Tapline.
There were many problems to surmount such as engineering diffi-
culties, supply and material problems, and political and man-
power problems. The engineering problems can be appreciated
when it is realized that the 1068-mile line had to pass through
a vast amount of desert in Saudi Arabia and had to traverse
rugged mountains in the western end. The terrain presented
such difficulties as local transportation and water supplies.
The supply situation involved the largest logistics problem
ever faced by a private company. Materials were ordered from
over 5,000 different firms in the United States 10,000 miles
away. Materials, even when readily available, had to be
ordered from six months to a year in advance. Shipment had
to be planned so that each article arrived at the work site
shortly before it was needed in order to prevent mountainous
stock-piles at the terminals. Many ingenious devices were
applied to reduce various transportation costs by reducing the
(30.)
number of trips needed from the United States. On the political
side, there were two major problems: the allocation of steel
and the Palestine situation. Grave difficulties arose over
securing a right-of-way through Syria, because of the stand the
United States had taken on the Jewish refugee problem. It
required a.long period of political wrangling with the Syrian
Parliament before approval of the right-of-way was finally
obtained. The steel question was even more difficult and was
also connected with the refugee problem. The steel supply was
very critical after the war and all steel shipped out of the
United States had to have government approval. Aramco only
received approval after it promised to reduce the price of
27.
crude shipped through the line. After construction was started,
the public and industrial opposition to these large exports of
steel caused the government to withdraw its approval. Aramco
then had to stop construction for approximately a year until the
28.
shortage of steel subsided.
The construction contracts were awarded to two different
companies; one to work inland from the Mediterranean coast and
the other to work inland from the Persian Gulf. Because there
was no adequate seaport, one construction company--in addition
to laying the pipeline--also had to construct a complete seaport
terminal. The time senuence of the construction operations was
29.
as follows:
Date construction authorized --- March 10, 1947
Date of first main line weld --- January 16, 1948
Date of final main line weld --- September 25, 1950
Date of first tankers loaded --- December 2, 1950
27. New York Times, August 22, 1952, p.25.
28. Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company, Tapline, (New York;
January 1951), pp. 3 f.
29. Ibid, p. 34.
(31..)
The portion of Saudi Arabia that Tapline traverses is
shown on the map on page 41 . Officially, the Tapline portion
o-f the line begins at the royalty-gauging tanks at Qaisumah and
extends westward 753.5 miles to the port of Sidon. From Qaisumrnh
eastward, the line is owned and operated by Aramco. This line
leads to other Aramco gathering facilities and can be extended
to new fields as they are discovered. Therefore, Aramco has
control whether the crude is sent to Qaisumah for transmission
to Sidon or whether it is sent to Ras Tanura, where it is either
refined or loaded directly on crude carrying tankers. The
following table gives some of the more pertinent facts concerning
30.
Tapline and its gathering facilities:
Aramco 30"-31"
Gathering Facilities Tapline Total
Maximum 300,000 BPD 300,000 BPD 300,000
Throughout
Length & 314.7 mi. 30"-31" OD 747.4 mi. 30"-31" OD
Size of 6.1 mi. 22"-24" OD 1068.1 mi.
Pipe
Volumetric 1,445,100 Bbls. 3,454,000 Bbls. 4,899,000 Bbls.
Contents
Pumping
Stations 2 4 6
Estimated $62,000,000 0168,000,000 0230,000,000
Total Cost
Actually, because temperature variations can affect the maximum
flow, the throughput can vary from 290,000 b.p.d. to 330,000 b.r.d.,
31.
derending upon the season of year. At Sidon, thirteen (now
30. Ibid, P. 33.
31. R.J. Liss, "Unattended Booster Station," 01 -n- G1's Jord-,
Vol. LI, (October 13, 1952), p. 207.
br~u
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increased to twenty) 180,000 tanks were constructed for the
storage of crude oil For the loading of tankers, there are
facilities for off-loading by gravity flow at a maximum rate
32.
of 26,000 barrels per hour. Altogether, Tapline and Aramco
require over six million barrels just to fill their pipeline
and supply working stocks. The gathering system is even more
complicated because it must handle both stabilized and unstabi-
lized crude. Unfortunately, Arabian oil contains the corrosive
hydrogen sulphide which is commonly referred to as "sour" crude.
Tapline, itself, does not transport "sour" crude, so the crude
must be processed through stabilizer columns before entering
33.
the Tapline portion. At present, Aramco has transportation
and storage facilities to handle over a million barrels per day.
Besides the construction of Tapline and its auxilliary
facilities, Pramco has made a number of other improvements:
the capacity of the Ras Tanura refinery has been increased from
34.
50,000 b.p.d. to 175,000 b.p.d., underwater crude pipe lines
were constructed from Ras Tanura to Behrein Island with a maximum
35.
throughput of 195,000 b.p.d., and a refinery has been con-
structed at Sidon by Caltex with a capacity of 13,000 b.p.d. to
36.
meet local needs and some of the tanker requirements. In
addition, Aramco has developed and supervised many construction
32. Trans-Arabian Pipe Line, oP.cit., p. 36.
33. Dahl M. Duff, A Series of Articles about the Arabian
American Oil Company, Rerrinted from the Oil and Gas
Journal, October 11, 1951, p. 4.
34. Ibid, p. 4.
35. "The Slow Boat to Bahrein," in Aramco World (published by
Arabian-American Oil Company: February 1953), p. 2.
36. "Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle
East," Supplement to the World Economic Report 1950-1951
(New York: United Nations Publications, April 1952), p. 23.
(33.)
works for Ibn Saud; such as constructing a. 350-mile railroad,
enlarging and improving port facilities, building highways and
airports, and conducting some experimental farm projects.
Alone with these major changes in operation facilities
and Aramco ownership, there were also some major changes in
Aramco's agreement with Saudi Arabia. There were some long-
standing disagreements in the original concession agreement
between Aramco and Saudi Arabian Government. In 1948,' one
disagreement was partially settled by increasing the royalties
from 22i a barrel to 34j a barrel. In 1950, Aramco became the
first company in the Middle East to enter into the 50-50 rrofit
split. In this agreement, the Saudi Arabian Government receives
50% of Aramco's net profits after taxes have been paid to the
U.S. Government. Aramco also agreed to move the main Aramco
headquarters from New York to Saudi Arabia and admit two Arabs -
to the Board of Directors. In return, theire were certain sti-
pulations that made Aramco royalty and payroll payments some-
what easier. Before, Aramco had to buy local currency from the
government at a premium rate and all royalty payments had to be
made in sovereigns. In the new contract, Aramco is permitted
to buy local currency at the prevailing rate, and is also
allowed to pay a certain proportion of the royalties in the
37.
currency which it receives for its crude and products. It is
known that the Saudi Arabian Government wanted to increase their
50% income by making Aramco sell to its parent companies at
the current Persian Gulf rrice instead of selling at the dis-
37. Ibid, p. 33.
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count which was arranged by a long-term contract between
Aramco and its parent comranies. The government also wanted
to increase the relinquishment rate~in the area where Aramco
has preferential rights. This would allow Ibn Saud to make
38.
additional concessions in these areas to other companies. No
details have been made public concerning these last proposals,
but they have evidently been settled in Aramco's favor.
In recapitulation, Aramco had a very slow beginning
in an under-develored region with a newly-formed government.
From the discouraging results of the first few years, Aramco
has progressed to the largest, single oil-producing company
in the world. Throughout this neriod of development, it has
had a stormy history with regard to controversial issues in
domestic and international politics. It undertook and completed,
in the face of tremendous obstacles, the construction of the
longest pipeline in the world. It has developed and maintained
the best possible relations with the Saudi Arabian government
and the Arabs. Because of the initiative displayed during its
development, Aramco is now in a position to play an exceedingly
important role in the future petroleum trade and price patterns.
38. "New Aramco Agreement," Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. LI
(June 30, 1952), p. 49.
(35.)
IV. General World Trade Pattern
The ultimate pattern of the world's international oil
trade depends upon the relationship between the oil-producing
areas and the highly industrialized areas that have high rates of
oil consumption. The areas of high crude oil production, in turn,
depend mostly upon the location of the world's known oil reserves.
The world's actual oil deposits naturally cannot be ch.-anged by
human endeavor, but the known oil reserves depend wholly upon
the exploration carried out by individuals and the oil companies.
Up through World War I, exploration was very extensive in the
United States, and we were-very fortunate to have huge oil
deposits to aid our industrial growth. However, between the
two World Wars, huge oil deposits were discovered in the
Caribbean area and the Middle East. The Caribbean area was
developed to a relatively high degree prior to World War II,
but the war retarded the development of the later discovered
Middle East fields. Consequently, the Middle East did not
have any appreciable effect in world trade until after its
rapid- expansion following the war.
As previously stated, the United States began extensive
oil exploration long before other areas of the world, It
thereby became the largest source of known reserves and
produced over three-quarters of the world's petroleum products.
The United States and the Caribbean area continued as the
ma or producers and exportersthrough World War II. The Middle
East exploration rate began on a large scale following the war
and the location of the known world's reserves changed tremen-
(36.)
dously during this period. This expansion resulted in the
following distribution of known reserves:.
39.
I. World Crude Oil Reserves as of January 1953.
Billions of Barrels
Far East-------- 2.3 (2.0%)
Europe---------- 7.6 (6.6%)
South America--- 11.0 (9.6%)
North America-- 32.5 (28.2%)---United States29.O (25.2%)
Middle East----- 61.6 j36%)---Saudi Arabia 18.0 (15.6%)
World Total-----115.0 (100.0%)
This table shows that the Middle East has, by far, the greatest
proportionate share of the world's known deposits, and its
pronortionate share is expected to continue to increase at a
rapid rate with further exploration work.
Table II, on the following page, indicates the relation-
ship between actual production and consumrtion of crude oil. It
is clear that there is very little correlation between these
three variables in certain cases. For example, North America
has less than one-third of the known reserves, yet it produces
and consumes over one-half of the total world production. On
the other hand, the Middle East has almost two-thirds of the
known reserves but only produces about one-sixth of the world
total end consumes an almost negligible amount. If all areas
of the world had an eoual degree of industrializetion and
political and other factors were about the same, there would
be a high correlation between production and known reserves;
and international trade'would probably exist in a comparatively
simple manner from excess-supply areas to deficit areas. Pro-
viding that some form of atomic energy does no-t supplant the
39. "World Crude Reserves," World Oil, Vol. CXXXVI (February 15,
1953), p. 265.
Crude Demand and Supply Areas for 1951 - in Barrels per Day*
Domestic
Demand
Excess
Demand
United States
Other North America
TOTALa "NORTH AMERICA
Caribbean Area
Other South America
TOTAL--SOUTH AMERICA
Europe (Excluding USSR)
U.S.S.R.
TOTAL--EUROPE
Africa
Middle East
TOTAL--MIDDLE EAST AREA
TOTAL--FAR EAST & OCEANIA
6,467,700( 6.5%)
584,800 5.1%)
7,052,500(61.6%)
240,600 (2.1%)
74*00 (*)
1,624,500(14.2%)
2, ,500 21.4)
328,000 (2.8%)
255.700 (22)
583,700 (5.0 )
632,300 (515%)
6,149,100( 2.4%)
6,489,700 55.3 )
1,865,400(15.9%)
124,000 (1.1 )
1,989,400(17.0 )
188,400 (1.6%)
787.00 (6*5,c 1
976,160 .83%7
46,500 (o.4%)
1.924.100(16.5)
1,970,600(16.9$)
292,900 (2.5%)
318,600
.244.200
562,800
378,200
1,436,100
44,'300
1,480,400
281,500
339,400
1,624,800
1,246,600
1,668.400
1,386,900
TOTAL--WORLD 11,467,800(100.0%) 11,718,700(100.0%)
* Source: "World Supply and Demand," World O11, International Operations Issue,(July 15, 1952), p. 57.
Crude
Supply
Excess
Supply
250,900
(3'.)
present huge demand for petroleum energy; this simple trade
situation may exist in the long-range picture. At present,
however, such is not the case because the geographic distri-
bution of the world's production differs widely from the geo-
graphic distribution of consumption with the exception of the
United States.
Today, the pattern of the world trade is believed to
be in the final stages of transition period. Historically,
the United States and Venezuela have been the principal
suppliers of Europe's petroleum products. However, in the
post war era, the United States has become a net importer of
petroleum products and Venezuelan crude exports to Europe have
been supplanted by Middle East crude oil. Since the rapid rise
of Middle East crude production, the Middle East is the only
logical source for the expanding European refineries. The
overall picture for the intercontinental petroleum trade in
1950 is shown on the map on the following page. There have
been some changes during the last two years; namely, more
movements of Middle East crude to the United States and the
Far East. There has also been a conseouent further decline in
Venezuelan movements to Europe, but the map shows the essential
large-scale movements. From Table II, it is easily seen that
the Middle East and the Caribbean area are the only two major
excess-supply areas. The map showing the intercontinental oil
trade is the natural reflection of that condition.
Unfortunately, the trade pattern is not quite as simple
as it appears on the map. Factors other than the mere existence
of the location of excess-demand and excess-supply areas play
a major role in the trade pattern. These factors will be men-
INTER-CONTIENTAL PETROLEUM MOVEMENTS
T HE Y E AR 1950 MIDDLE EAST EXPORTED
TOTA L itt ODUCTION
TOA 10,965,800 B/D
CARIBBEANIR TE0
6.000 1/0
5B o /D
so Boos ONES 
--4 E
5.000~~500 
1/r~o //D m
50.000 s/0
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Source: Arabian American Oil Company, Middle e st Oil Developments (New York: 1952), p. 9.%_0
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tioned in the next chapter. The major reason for Europe's
import needs is the tremendous amount of reconstruction that
has followed the destructiveness incurred in the war. This
expansion has been largely financed by funds from the European
Recovery Program, which was initiated and finarnced by the United
States. One of the main goals of the E.R.P. countries has been
the expansion of its refinery capacity. This expanded refinery
capacity would permit these countries to conserve their much-
needed funds by importing cheap crude oil from the Middle East
instead of being compelled to purchase the higher-priced,
finished products from the United States. This same refinery
expansion in Europe has been the major retarding factor of
refinery capacity in the Middle East. Because of this rapid
increase in European refinery caracity, the Middle East has been
hard-pressed to supply sufficient crude for these refineries.
From the end of the war until the end of 1951, there has been
an average demand increase of approximately ten per cent per
year in Europe alone. The production graph on page 41 shows the
tremendous rate of development that the major fields of the
Middle East have undergone in order to meet the increase of
demand.
In 1950, the Middle East finally disolaced the Carib-
bean area as the largest net exporting area of the world. The
following chart traces the mounting Middle East exportable
crude surplus in the post-war years, in relation to how this
production is rapidly closing the statistical gap in total
40.
European and African reauired petroleum supply.
40. R.E. Spann, "Royalty Pacts Increase Oil Flow in Middle
East," World Oil, Vol. CXXXV (November 1952), p. 330.
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reauirements.
Many of the expansion projects are being, or have been, com-
pleted within the last two years. This has consequently
reduced the yearly increase in consumntion from the high
ten per cent to a more normal rate of five per cent per year.
As seen by the preceeding chart, either Middle East production
will have to be reduced or else new markets will have to be
sought.. The factors that will -primarily affect the future
trend of the international petroleum trade will be discussed
in the next chapter.
(43.)
V. Factors Affecting World Trade
In the preceeding chapter, the relationship was shown
between known reserves, areas of excess production, and areas
deficient in their oil supply. Although these three factors are
the basis upon which the international trade is dependent, there
are several other critical factors that have a large effect on
the short-range trade pattern. Each of these factors could
provide a basis for exhaustive research, so it would be impossible
to deal with all of the ramifications of each factor. However,
a very poor analysis of any international oil company's operations
would result if these factors were not taken into account.
A. Ownership and Control of Oil Operations
Currently, the U.S. Government is conducting a civil
suit against five U.S. petroleum companies. This suit is based
mostly upon a report made by the Federal Trade Commission, which
was released in August 1952. This report has a large number of
charts and tables showing the high degree of control that is
concentrated in seven international petroleum companies; namely,
the four parent companies of Aramco: the Gulf Oil Corporation,
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., and the Royal-Dutch Shell
group. In 1949, these seven companies, through their various
integrated subsidiaries, owned 65 per cent of the world's esti-
mated crude reserves. Excluding Russia and Mexico whose petro-
leum operations are government controlled and the U.S. where
ownership is largely decentralized, these seven companies con-
trolled about 92 per cent of the estimated crude reserves. By
virtue of owning most of the world's known reserves, the comnanies
accounted for over 50% of- the world's crude production (excluding
(44.)
Russia).and about 99% of the production in the Middle East.
The map on the following page shows some of the major con-
cessions in the Middle East and the ownership of these con-
cessions. In addition, the companies also control over one-
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half of the world's crude-fining and cracking capacity.
Besides the high degree of control which it is possible
for these companies to exercise, they are also linked. closely
by a. vast and complicated network of interlocking directorates.
There is a vertical integration of the numerous subsidiaries
which permits control from the exploration stage to the final
marketing of the products to the consumers.
This high degree of concentration has arisen, primarily,
because only the major companies had sufficient capital to bet
against the many hazardous risks that are inherent in any foreign
oil venture. Obviously, this degree of concentration must have
many and varied effects on international petroleum operations.
Whether or not this concentration of ownership has resulted in
an international cartel with sufficient control to set retroleum
prices and movements with no dependency on normal supply and
demand is for the U.S. courts to decide. However, it must be
recognized that each of the parent companies of Aramco have ex-
tensive interests in all parts of the world and their individual
decisions, at least, will reflect this condition.
B. Base-Point Pricing System
The base-point pricing system is used in several industries.
Because of its seemingly unfairness, it has been a very contro-
41. The International Petroleum Cartel, op.cit., p. 23 ff.
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versial issue for many years. In simple form, this system
establishes a base point in a certain geographical area. It
is usually located at a recognized point where the particular
product is mostly produced. Then, when the product is sold in
an area other than the base point area, a freight charge is
added to the recognized price at the base point. Thus, a
producer operating closer to the selling market than the base
point still sells his product at the prevailing rate, which is
the base point price plus freight from the base point. Since
the producer operating closer to the market doesn't really have
to pay quite as much freight, he makes a higher profit because
of "phantom" freight. In the opposite case, when the selling
market is closer to the base point than it is to the producer,
the producer makes less profit because he must meet the base
point price and also pay--or "absorb"--additional freight charges.
In the case of petroleum, the U.S. Gulf Coast emerged
as the base point. During the long period prior to World War II,
the United States supplied almost all of the world's petroleum
needs; hence, the Gulf Coast also became the base point for almost
all international petroleum trade. The "Gulf" price is indirectly
determined by state government commissions acting in conjunction
with the Department of Interior. For example, the Texas Railroad
Commission, which controls all of the oil and gas wells in Texas,
is one of the most important factors in our domestic oil supply.
This commission has the legal power to regulate all of the oil
production in Texas, the major source of oil in the United States. v
Each month, this commission decided on the "allowables, or the
amount of oil each Texas well can take from the ground. There
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are similar controlling bodies in the other oil-rich states,
and the combination of their decisions--adjusting the supply
to the demand--determines the crude prices within a narrow
range in the competitive U.S. industry. This indirectly
predetermined-price meant that the "Gulf" price for domestic
and international trade was also determined by the state com-
missions.
Since the war, the United States has changed from the
world's chief supplier to a net importer, and the Middle East
and the Caribbean have become the major net exporters. This
sudden switch has modified the previous single base-point system
into a triple base-point system; namely, the U.S. Gulf, the
Caribbean, and the Middle East. This new system is still in a
period of transition. There is a. strong relationship between
the three base point prices, but the U.S. Gulf price is still
the dominating factor and will probably continue to set world
prices in spite of U.S. production being effectively removed
from international trade.
C. Oil Tankers
As noted above, the freight charges play an important
role in the final delivered price of petroleum. The oil tankers
are the major component of the freight charges in conducting
international trade. The determination of tanker freight charges
has become extremely .complicated in recent years, which adds
additional difficulties to the also complex basing point system.
Early in World War II, the United States Maritime Commission
established a set of tanker rates for its own sizable tanker
fleet. Although their rates have very little significance today,
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their designation i still used by the oil companies for the
convenience of standardization. Thus, today, tanker rates are
usually quoted as USMC plus or minus a certain percentage.
The complex nature of tanker rates arises from the fact
that tankers may be chartered either for a single voyage. or
for a time charter from two to ten years, or the tankers may be
owned by the oil companies themselves. The single voyage rate,
or spot tanker rate, is naturally the highest and has high price
fluctuations; therefore, they only 'comprise about ten per cent
of the total tanker voyages. The time charter rates are establishe
semi-annually by a board of independent brokers thiat meet in
London. The major oil companies own and operate a very substantail
number of tankers. The freiTht charges used by the individual
companies may have a wide disnarity depending upon which freight
rate they use. for instance, Socony-Vacuum usually used the
two-year time charter rates; Caltex usually used the USMC rate;
and Jersey Standard uses its own formula that depends on a com-
bination of the various rates.
Since the war, many new tankers have been built and
designed. For purposes of comparison, all tankers are converted
to an equivalent number of the war-time, T-2 tankers. The T-2
tanker had a capacity of 16,765 deadweight tons or about
135,000 barrels of crude. It had a speed of 14.5 knots and
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carried a crew of 43 men. After the war, there was a critical
shortage of tankers due to wartime sinkings, natural depreciation,
and very little construction during the war years. However, a
large construction program was started after the war to relieve
42.. "An Analysis of World Tank Ship Fleets,' Marine News,
Vol XXXIX (April 1953), p. 20.
43. Ibid, p. 20.
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this critical shortage. Table III shows the increase from
1945 to 1952, and the number expected in 1957 under the present
scheduled construction program and ass.uming a full scrappage
rate on a 20-year tanker-life.
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Table III.
Date T-2 Eauivalents Per Cent Gain
September 1945 1,264.5 -
April 1951 1,544.1 36.6%
October 1952 1,726.8 11.8%
January 1957 2,409.4 39.5%
In October 1952, tanker demand was about equal to the tanker
supply, yet the construction program shows an average 6.5%
yearly gain in the tamker supply between 1952 and 1957. In
the same period, petroleum demand is only expected to increase
at a yearly rate of 4%. There are also several proposed pipe
lines that should decrease the tanker demand. So, the tankers
should be in oversupply during the next few years, and this
should reflect itself in decreased tanker rates. The first
indication of this fact occurred in February 1953, when Socony-
Vacuum reduced its f.o.b. pr-ice for crude oil at Sidon, Lebanon
due to the decreased tanker rates.
Tanker rates are extremely important in the-Middle East
prices because of its relative isolation from the large con-
sumption areas. Table IV shows the number of tankers emrloyed
in the Middle East and their distinations in 1950.
(50.)
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Table IV.
T-2 Tankers from
Persian Gulf to- Crude Oil Products Total
East Coast, USA 84 ---- 84
Europe & Near East 235 107 342
Oceania (Hawaii) 1 33 34
South & East Asia 7 37 44
Latin America & Caribbean 22 2 24
Canada 25 ---- 25
South & East Africa ---- 18 18
TOTAL 394 197 591
There was a total world fleet of 1208 T02 eauivalent tankers
in 1950; therefore, the Middle East along reouired 47% of the
world's total tanker fleet.
The world's tanker fleet, like the world's known
reserves, is also substantially owned or controlled by the
retrolcum comnanies as shown below.
In October 1952:
32.9% of the world fleet was owned by oil
companies.
55.4% of the world fleet was owned by non-oil
companies.
11.7% of the world fleet was owned by. the
governments.
Of the 395.3 T-2 equivalent tankers that were privately owned
in the United States, 272.2 or 68.9% were owned by U.S. petroleum
compnranies. Jersey Standard was the largest single owner,having
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57.4 T-2 equivalent tankers.
44. Benedict Saurina, "World Tanker Fleet," World Oil,
Vol. CXXXVI (February 15, 1952), p. 274.
45. Marine News, on.cit., p. 20.
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D. The Dollar Gap
There has been a dollar gap for the last 75 years,
since the United States has been a net exporter of goods.
However, it has only become critical in the post war period.
For the purposes of international trade, the difficulties are
primarily centered in the dollar-sterling problem. Approximately
one-half of all international payments are settled in sterling.
The importance of the sterling-dollar problem can be appreciated
when it is remembered that petroleum and its products constitute
the largest single item in international trade and that the
ownership and control of oil in international trade is pre-
ponderantly Britisi and American.
Essentially, there is a dollar shortage in the sense
that foreign countries are not earning as many dollars as they
need to settle their dollar obligations. Prior to World War II,
the problem was not critical since much of the trade unbalance
was offset by income on foreign investments located in the
United States and other dollar areas. During World War II, our
allies had to rely heavily on lend-lease from the United States
and the liquidation of their foreign assets in order to finance
the war. After.the war, the following over-simplified condition
increased the dollar gap: the great physical devastation that
occurred during the war caused a heavy inflation, greatly re-
stricting the export possibilities of the foreign countries;
another reason is that the war did not really end at all but
has continued- at various degrees of intensity, thus prohibiting
the foreign.countries from devoting all of their resources to
POWW=
In addition to the above problems, Britain has had
additional difficulties. The exceptionally heavy drain on her
resources and her loss of many foreign investments caused her
to incur many foreign debts, mostly in sterling, to other
sterling countries. To prevent the rapid exchange of sterling
for dollars, Britain had to imoose drastic limitations on the
free convertibility of sterling into dollars in order to retain
her fast diminishing dollar resources. After the war, Britain
had to drastically reduce imports from drollar areas in an
attempt to repay her sterling debts. Britain had an extremely
difficult time trying to build up her export surplus because of
war destruction and obsolete equipment. The post war orice
inflation in Britain made it imoossible for her to comoete in
the international market. The situation became so critical in
the business slump of 1949 that she had to devalue her pound in
order to meet international competition. However, the Korean
situation and the consecuent return of a better sellers' market,
together with her drastic import measures, have gradually im-
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increasing their export trade to the proper balance. The
consequence of these factors is that the foreign countries
have had to spend their much-needed income on defense projects
and have had to rely on the United States for food, raw materials,
capital equipment, and other goods reQuired for survival as well
as for reconstruction and rehabilitation. They have had to
spend more dollars than they have earned, and the E.C.A. grants
and loans and other relief programs have been used to bridge
the dollar gap.
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proved Britain's financial position in the last two years.
This dollar gap and the dollar-sterling problem have
had an immense effect on the international petroleum trade.
From the British standpoint, oil is extremely important to
the Emnire as a whole. Oil resources under British control
and the world-wide trading position of the Angvlo-Iranian Company
and the British-Dutch Shell group are immense assets to the
British economic position. So the British naturally expected
their oil assets to play a major role in their oost war recovery.
But despite Britain's strong crude supply position, the sterling
area has regularly had to buy a substantial quantity of oil
products from dollar areas in order to meet overall requirements.
The main reason for this is that the British companies had never
built sufficient refining capacity to supply their world-wide
markets and the needs of the sterling area as well.
It was rather ironical that Britain had to spend a
large proportion of her much-needed dollars for the one thing
in which she might have been most self-sufficient. However,
many countries outside of the sterling area which were forced
to purchase dollar oil were also feeling the dollar shortage,
and these countries renresented potential new markets for British
sterling oil as it could be made available. When these countries
were in a position to supply Britain with food and raw materials
that could be obtained otherwise only for dollars, there were
advantages to be gained by both sides from bilateral trade agree-
ments which subsituted sterling oil for American dollar oil.
Thus, expansion of its oil industry with special emphasis on
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increased refining capacity became one of Britain's foremost
objectives in its recovery program.
During this period of expansion, E.C.A. funds were
sufficiently provided to avoid any financial disaster and to
aid Britain in her expansion program. By the time of the
business slump in 1949, the British capacity had finally been
increased beyond the point to satisfy their customary markets.
At this time, the British made several successful inroads to
the customary American markets: for example, Egypt and Argentina,
who were previously almost exclusively American markets. In
November 1949, t-'e British announced that their refining capacity
had been increased to the point where they would have a product
surplus of 75,000 b.p.d. above their normal market needs; and,
in order to save dollars, they were going to use this surplus
in the sterling area to replace an equivalent amount of American
oil To the American companies, this meant a cut of about 30%
in their total sterling area business, and further cuts were
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indicated. This presented a serious problem to American
foreign oil interests. In 1949, there was the world-wide
business slump and oil suprly was exceeding oil demand. Also,
because of certain exchange regulation agreements, it was
practically impossible for dollar oil to compete with sterling
oil. If the American foreign markets were substantially decreased,
it would eventually mean decreased production which could endanger
their oil concessions as many Middle East governments depended
46. H.D. Armstrong, "The Dollar-Sterling Problems," Addresses
and Reports Delivered at the Thirtieth Annual Meeting,
Vol. XXX, Section I (Los Angeles: 1950), p. 60 ff.
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almost wholly on oil royalties for their existence. This
situation was brought to the attention of Washington and many
high-level conferences were held. The U.S. State Department
became actively concerned as there was important questions of
international diplomatic relations, protection of American
foreign investments, world-wide military strategy, and the
effect of huge potential oil surpluses on general business
conditions to be considered.
Arguments were advanced to show that even British
oil contained a substantial dollar component because some
royalties had to be paid in dollars and a substantial amount
of their supplies had to be purchased in dollar areas. Finally,
th.e growing prob-lem was alleviated in several ways: the British
agreed to limit further expansion of their refining capacity;
American companies made individual agreements with the sterling
area countries by reducing the dollar component of dollar oil;
the general reduction of the dollar gap due to improved con-
ditions; and, finally, the increased oil demand because of the
Korean situation.
There are counterparts of the dollar-sterling problem
in all countries where American companies have marketing facilities;
and, although the dollar gap problem is not critical at the moment,
the above listed alleviating factors represent only temporary
conditions. Therefore, the major oil companies have been very
busy in the last two years, negotiating with the individual
governments. Many agreements have been signed that are designed
to provide a long-term solution to the dollar gap nroblem, and
only time will tell if these agreements will be adequate to
(56.)
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eliminate the dollar problem in world oil trade.
E. Political Factors
Many political factors have already been mentioned
with regard to obtaining foreign concessions, the dollar gap
problem, the petroleum pricing system, and Aramco's development.
In this section, only a very small number of the current poli-
tical factors that may affect the future petroleum price and
distribution will be discussed.
Probably. the greatest political factor involves the
sudden shift from a peacetime economy to a wartime economy, or
vice versa, and also a situation such as the "cold war" that
exists in the world today. There are enormous problems linked
with this shift in the petroleum industry. Not only may the
oil demand take a sudden change, but the principal suprly areas--
such as the Middle last--may be completely lost. If war occurs,
there may be a great shift in the areas of greatest demands
which could greatly overburden the petroleum industry's trans-
portation facilities. There are so many possible changes that
war time transition could cause that the subject will not be
explored in this paper.
One of the major factors determining crude oil move-
ments is the location of the refineries. The determination
of these locations is influenced by several factors. The
historical experience of American oil interests in engaging
in foreign refining are primarily in four categories:
(1.) Where local refining was attractive on a
purely economic basis exclusive of artificial regula-
tions; e.g., where th.ere is local crude rroduction and
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either a local or a tributary product market that
can be supplied more economically by local refining
than from any other source.
(2.) Where local refining was not attractive on
a purely economic basis but was made so by a tariff
against inports. This situation occurs in locations
where there is no local crude oil supply but where--for
reasons of local labor, national defense, or currency
situation--the local government offers protection to
local refining as against importation of products. This
type of situation is precarious because tariff laws can
be changed on short notice and, with local protection
removed, the local refinery becomes uneconomical.
(3.) Where local refining was not attractive on
a purely economic basis but was forced by means of a
high protective tariff and a system of import licences.
(4.) Where local refining was forced in countries
having large crude oil reserves either developed or
potential by making refining obligatory as a part of
securing or holding concessions for exploration and
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development.
The European refinery expansion was mostly the result
of the third type, while refinery construction in the Middle
East was primarily due to the f-urth type. Thus, the govern-
ments of consumption areas represent oprosite views from the
governments of the excess-supply areas. The oil company is,
47. L.M. Fanning, op.cit., p. 116.
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therefore, caught in the middle of these two conflicting interests,
and it must resolve many ticklish problems by compromises with
the various governments.
One of the major fears of an oil company operating in
foreign countries is the threat of nationalization, such as the
one that occurred to the Anglo-Iranian Company in Iran recently.
The oil industry in Iran was nationalized in the suTmer of 1951,
and it has caused some unexpected problems, When the Iranian
oil was removed from world trade, a tremendous deficiency in the
world supply occurred. This deficiency was rapidly overcome by
increased production by the. other major oil companies. Now these
two serious problems are facing the petroleum industry. The
first problem is what will happen if the British regain their
concession. The other major companies now supply the former
outlets of the Anglo-Iranian Company, and serious problems
could arise in ad lusting new*outlets when Iranian oil returns
to the picture. The second problem affects the entire pricing
system of the petroleum industry. At present, the Iranian
Government is trying to produce and refine its own oil In an
effort to gain market outlets for its production, the government
is deviating from petroleum price structure and offering its oil
to other countries at a price considerably less than the pre-
vailing price. Most countries are afraid to accept this oil
from Iran because they are afraid of damaging friendly relations
with the British. However, several countries have ordered this
low-price oil, and so the Iranian Governement could greatly change
the existing price and supply pattern if it attains sufficient
production and gains general acceptance from other countries.
(59.)
VI. Aramco Price Analysis
A. Prpduction Costs
In any discussion of the petroleum industry today,
one of the most controversial subjects is the cheap nroduction
costs of Middle East oil in comparison with the production costs
in the United States. In the first part of this chapter, a
comparison will be made between these two costs. However, it
appears that a comparison of production costs in Saudi Arabia
alonewith the U.S. Production costs will give a poor basis for
the determination of the price for Arabian crude. The price of
Arabian crude is admittedly not based primarily on the production
costs of the Arabian crude. The price is computed by the parent
companies on the basis of a reasonable return on the investments
48.
made all over the world. In other words, the parent companies
of Aramco would charge a price (compatible with demand) that
would yield a high profit on their Aramco investment to make
up for loss of investments incurred in other parts of the world.
The Abquarq field is Aramco's major producing field.
It has been exploited in a manner that gives a much higher
efficiency than any field in the U.S. could attain. Instead
of -drilling wells all over the field as it has to be done in
the U.S. because of wide ownership of the land, Aramco has set
up 57 wells in a semi-circle around an area of 50,000 acres.
At present, the water and natural gas pressure is sufficient
to produce free flow of the oil at a rate exceeding 5,000 b.p.d.
49.
for each well. And excluding Initial failures in its early
48. Hearings Before a Special Committee Investigating the National
Defense Program, Part 41, o-n.cit., p. 24896.
49. T.J. Kelly, "The Oil of the Middle East," Vital Speeches
of the Day, (July 1, 1951), p. 34.
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history, Aramco very seldom drills a dry well. In the U.S.,
on the other hand, there may be several wells to the acre and
the average production, with forced natural gas pressure, is
only around 12 b.p.d. Also, out of the 20,000 wells that are
drilled in the U.S. each year, about one-fourth are dry. Ewven
though the Arabian wells cost about twice as much to drill -as
the U.S. wells ($300,000 to $125,000), it is easily seen that
a productive field in the Middle East is far cheaper to drill
50.
for the same capacity than a field in the U.S. The auestion
of relative labor costs is difficult to compare accurately.
Aramco employs about 14,500 Arabs with a starting pay of 92/
a day, and about 2,500 skilled American labor at a rate of
51.
approximately twice their domestic wages. Some petroleum
antagonists manintain that this excessive cheap labor is a
major factor contributing to low production costs. The
Aramco officials, however, say that the cheap labor is in
reality more expensive in spite of the low wage rates by U.S.
standards. They maintain they must spend a large smount of
money for various training programs and still thie labor out-
put is very small for the totally unskilled Arabs. In addition,
they must provide personnel transportation back and forth to
the U.S. for the American workers and their families.. They
also have to provide lodgings, other necessities of life, and
some luxury items to entice high caliber American workers to
Saudi Arabia. On this basis, it would apnear that there is no
50. Hearings Before a Special Committee Investigating the
National Defense Program, Part 41, oo.cit., p. 25298.
51. Ibid, p. 24961.
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substantial difference of labor costs between the United
States and Saudi Arabia.
In 1947, the estimated direct production costs were
24# a barrel plus the 21. royalty to the Saudi Arabian govern-
52.
ment--a total of 45# per barrel. In addition, it was estimated
for every dollar spent on direct production costs, a #120 was
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spent for other indirect costs. This figure would give a
total production cost of 53# (24# plus 29#) plus 21# royalty--
a total of 74# per barrel prior to 1948 when the royalty was
increased to 34d a barrel. However, the ratio--l.2 to 1--of
indirect costs to direct costs was estimated in 1952, and tie
ratio is probably much smaller for the years prior to Aramco's
expansion program in 1947. This smaller ratio would thereby
decrease Aramco's total production cost prior to 1947. Because
it is not certain which different components are included in
estimating this ratio, there may be some duplication of various
factors which would effect the value of this ratio, and thereby
reduce the accuracy of the total production cost.
B. Prices Prior to Tapline.
In the period before the end of World War II, almost
all of Aramco's crude oil went either to Bahrein Island for
refining or else it was used in local consumption. Except for
a long-term contract for crude oil to Japan prior to 1941, this
condition existed until the end of the war. The crude oil sold
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to Japan was priced at 86c per barrel, f.o.b. Ras Tanura.
52. Ibid, p. 25009.
53. D.M. Duff, A Series of Articles about the Arabian American
Oil Company, op.cit., p. 15.
54. Hearings Before a Special Committee Investigating the
National Defense Program, Part 41, op.cit., p. 24847.
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During the war, the first major break in the single base point
system at the U.S. Gulf occurred* The British Navy was pur-
chasing large amounts of oil in the Middle East. Because of
Britain's poor financial position at the time, the government
strongly objected to paying the "phantom" freight from the
U.S. Gulf Coast on oil purchased in the Middle East. In its
negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the British
obtained an agreement that effectively started the dual base
point system. The oil company set its price so that its crude
oil price was the same f.o.b. Persian Gulf as comparable
crude f.o.b. U.S. Gulf. This policy effectively eliminated
the "phantom" freight rate from the U.S. Gulf to the Middle
East. This policy also determined the future price pattern
in the early post war years.
In 1945, two factors appeared that had an important
influence on the future trend of the Persian Gulf base price.
The first was the rapid increase in Middle East output and its
large scale entry into world trade. The second was the rapid
series of price increases that occurred in the U.S. after the
removal of the war-time price ceilings. In 1945, Aramco con-
tracted to sell crude to the U.S. Navy at $1.05 per barrel,
f.o.b. Ras Tanura. This was also the low quoted on the U.S.
55.
Gulf for comparable crude. This meant that Aramco in its
first large postwar contract was establishing the practice of
equalizing the base prices of the Persian Gulf and the U.S. Gulf.
By ecualizing the two base prices, Aramco effectively equalized
55. Ibid, p. 25150.
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the delivered price in the Mid-Mediterranean Sea, because
this point was an equal distance by tanker from Ras Tanura and
the U.S. Gulf. This price remained constant until March 1947,
when several new developments occurred that caused a series of
changes in the price of Arabian Oil.
This was the period of the initiel agreement to admit
Socony-Vacuum and Jersey Standard into Aramco. This meant that
Aramco crude and its products would be sold to three marketing
subsidiary companies instead of only selling to Caltex. By
this time, Aramco had increased its production sufficiently to
enable it to enter new markets. Fortunately, this was also
the time when E.R.P. funds began to flow to Europe, and its
consecuent refinery expansion began. To enable Aramco crude to
enter Europe on a competitive basis with Venezuelan crude, it
would be necessary to reduce the Middle East base price below
that of the U.S. Gulf. However, this reduction became unnecessary
as the U.S. Gulf price began its rapid series of increases. The
U.S. Gulf price increased to such a high degree that the Aramco
was also able to -increase its base price by smaller proportion
and, also, move the point of equalized delivered prices from the
mid-Mediterranean to the British Coast. There was a considerable
time lag in the various base prices of the three marketing
companies during this series of increases. But by July 1948,
all of the marketing companies of Aramco were charging the same
base price. In this period from 1945 to July 1948, the Middle
East base price had increased p.83 while the U.S. Gulf rrice
had increased $1.40. On the basis of the straight USMC rates,
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the delivered price in the United Kingdom was now the same
for crude oil delivered from the Persian Gulf and the Carib-
bean area. The prices were as follows in July 1948 for 36
A.P.I. gravity crude.
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From--
U. S. Gulf.......#2.75 (f.o.b.) pilus ft.01 (USMC)=43.76
Caribbean Area...02.65 (f.o.b.) plus *0.86 (USMC)=$3.51
Persian Gulf.....$2.07 (f.o.b.) plus $1.44 (USMC)=$3.5l
This comparison shows that theoretically the U.S. companies were
effectively eliminated from the European crude market even if
there was an excess available for export. And, theoretically,
the Caribbean and the Middle East were on eaual terms as far as
European and Britain competition were concerned. After July 1948,
there were two further reductions in the Middle East base price
while the Caribbean base price remained aprroximately the same.
These reductions effectively placed Middle East oil in a better
competitive position in the European markets than the Caribbean
area now had. The general changes of the Persian Gulf base piices
are shown below.
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Period Base Price, f.o.b.
Ras Tanura for 36' A.P.I.
Gravity
September 1945 1.05
June 1948 2.2July 1948 2.07
April 1949 1.88
September 1949 1.75
56. Select Committee of Small Business, House of Representatives,
81st Congress, 1st Session, "Hearings Pursuant to H. Res. 22,
A Resolution Creating a Selecti Committee to Conduct an
Investigation of Problems of Small Business--Effects of Foreign
Oil Imports on Independent Domestic Producers, Part 2, r. F71.
57. Ibid, p. 539.
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It is hard to determine the significance of these Persian
Gulf prices because of the episode that occurred in the
summer of 1949, when there was a shortage of oil on the
U.S. East Coast. During this period, a large quantity of
Arabian crude was exported to the U.S. and was sold at the
prevailing price at that point. At that time, crude was being
sold on the East Coast for $4.79 per barrel and the spot
tanker rate from Ras Tanura to New York was approximately
$3.39 per barrel. In order to meet this price, the base price
at Ras Tanura was effectively $4.79 - $3.39 - *.10 (U.S. Tariff)
58.
or #1.30 instead of the $1.88 that was listed at the time.
The final Ras Tanura base price of #1.75 has remained constant
up to the present time, but there have been other instances
where the marketing companies have effectively used a different
base price by absorbing the freight rate. During the same period,
the constant for the ownership of Aramco becamp permanent.
After the ownership became permanent, a long-term contract was
drawn up between Aramco and its parent companies that established
a price of $1.43 per barrel for all crude sold by Aramco to its
parent companies or their marketing subsidiaries.
C .-Tapline .
In December 1950, Tapline began its operations which
were to bring the oil fields of Saudi Arabia some 3,500 miles
nearer to the markets of Western Europe. This 1,068 mile
pipeline saved approximately 7,000 miles of sailing by 65
tankers taking 20 days to make the round trip from Ras Tanura
58. New York Times, August 22, 1952, p. 25.
.-. EM
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to Sidon, Lebanon. The pipeline was capable of handling
300,000 b.p.c. of Arabia's crude, or almost half of Aramco's
production. The pipeline had to traverse three countries besides
Saudi Arabia; namely, Lebanon, Syria, and the Hashimite Kingdom
of the Jordan. Individual contracts had to be negotiated with
each of the latter three countries. Besides certain agreements
to supply local needs at the lowest prevailing rates,, Tapline
agreed to pay each of the three countries the same royalty rate
for the amount of crude that moved through Tapline. The amount
of this royalty was $7.00 per metric ton, or 4( per barrelto
59.
each country. This gives a -total royalty rate of 12# for
each barrel of crude passing through Tapline. The estimated
cost of transporting oil through Tapline is about 18# per
60.
barrel. Therefore, the total operating cost is an estimated
30# per barrel.
It might be well to mention again th'.e fact that Aramco's
original royalty payments were changed at this time. Instead
of receiving a fixed 34# royalty per barrel, the Saudi Arabian
government was now to receive payments totaling 50% of Aramco's
profits after taxes were paid to the U.S. Government. This
profit is determined from the price that Aramco sells its
crude and products to the marketing subsidiaries of the parent
companies. This new royalty procedure naturally makes the
Arabian Government try to increase the $1.43 price that Aramco
now uses to sell to the marketing companies.
59. K.S. Twitchell, op.cit., p. 200.
60. Hearings Before a Special Committee Irvestigating the
National Defense Program, Part 41, "p.cit., p. 24898.
(67.)
On December 2, 1950, when Tapline began its operations,
Socony-Vacuum made the first public posting of Middle East
prices. Although previously the rrices were readily available,
this first public posting gave the prices an official writtern
record. The parent companies auoted the following prices for
61.
36 A.P.I. Gravity crude:
f.o.b. f.o.b.
Ras Tanura Sidon Difference
Socony-Vacuum #1.75 *2.41 $.66
Jersey Standard #1.75 #2.55 $.80
Caltex $1.75 #2.45 $.70
The USMC rate from Ras Tanura to Sidon is 0.70,including the
Suez Canal toll of 184 per barrel. This was the basis from
which Caltex computed its Sidon price. Jersey Standard used
its own formula which is based on several types of freight rates.
Socony-Vacuum used the two year time charter rates. Within a
few days after Socony's Sidon posting, the remaining three
companies reduced their Sidon price to match Socony's price.
Therefore, the Sidon price was based wholly upon the tanker
freight rate of 66# when the actual pipeline freight rate was
around 301, representing an additional profit of 36i. Although
this 36# figure does not include any amortization charges or
risk of investment factors, etc.--it is clearly a source of
additional high profits for the parent comoanies. Because of
the huge markets in the area west of the Suez, the majority of
the crude must still be supplied by tankers from the Persian Gulf.
61. D. M. Duff, "Middle East Postin Oil and Gas Journal,
Vol. XXXXIX (December 7, 1950), p. 67.
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Until such time when there is sufficient pipeline capacity
from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to
supply most of the West of Suez area, the Sidon price will
probably be linked more closely to the tanker freight rates
instead of the pipeline operation costs. Otherwise, the Ras
Tanura f.o.b. price would be reduced by abeorbing the freight,
or there would be discrimination between the various markets
to determine which would receive the benefit of the lower
pipeline costs. When sufficient pipeline capacity to the
Mediterranean is attained, the East Mediterranean is expected
to replace the Persian Gulf as the Middle East basing point.
Since the completion of Tapline and other crude pipe-
lines throughout the world, the tankers that were formerly in
short supply are now in an excess suprly. This depression in
the tanker market has permitted Arabian crude to compete in an
ever-increasing area. The tanker rates for charter voyages from
the Persian Gulf to the United States have declined from as
much as USMiC plus 150% to USMC minus 40%. This has allowed
Arabian crude to move to the United States in increasing
quantities--both to the East Coast and to the West Coast. For
example, in January 1953, the rate from the Persian Gulf to
the U.S. East Coast was 01,34 per barrel (USMC minus 20%) for
36* A.P.I. Gravity crude. This gave a laid-down price in
New York of $1.75 plus $1.74 plus 10.5, (duty) or a total of
#3.19.5 per barrel to compare with the laid-down price of West
62.
Texas crude on the East Coast of 43.20. A similar development
62. "Middle East-West Texas Sour Crude oh Br6ak--evan Cost Basis
to East," National Petroleum News, Vol. XXXXV (Jpnuary 14,
1953), p. 40.
63. "Mid East Crude to Los Angeles," National Petroleum News,
Vol. XXXXV (February 4, 1953), p. 63.
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is occurring on the West Coast, where there is a heavy shortage
at present. Arabian 35* A.P.I. crude has a present tanker rate
from Ras Tanura to Los Angeles of *1.32 per barrel (USMC minus
40%). Therefore, total cost is *1.73 plus $1.32 plus 10.5# or
*3.15.5. This is 29V higher than California crude, but it is
63.
13.5# lower than Canadien crude to Los Angeles. Because of the
lessening of the freight differential between the Persian Gulf
to Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe, resulting
from the declining tanker freight rates, the price of Arabian
crude has been reduced 12V to a $2.29 Sidon base price.
Walter Levy, a prominent petroleum economist, has
predicted that when the present transitional supply and demand
relationships have finally evolved, the Middle East crude oil
price, f.o.b. Eastern Mediterranean, will probably be deter-
mined by a fluctuation between a low which will allow Middle
East crude to compete with U.S. and Caribbean crude on the
U.S. East Coast and a high which would allow Caribbean crude
to compete with Middle East crude in Western Europe.
(70.)
VII. Aramcc Distribution
In general, the distribution of Aramco crude oil
has follwed the general pattern of Middle East oil. Aramco.
crude did not become an important factor in world trade until
1947, when it began its rise to the largest single crude
producer in the world. The graph on the following page shows
the general trend of Aramco's distribution of crude oil to the
different regions of the world from 1946 through 1951, Exports
to South America are not shown because of the very small quantity
that moved in that direction. However, this situation may change
if the dollar-sterling problem is favorably resolved for Aramco's
distributors. In addition, a refinery is being constructed in
Brazil with a capacity of 20,000 b.p.d. It is being designed
to operate on Persian Gulf crude, mostly supplied by Aramco.
If tanker rates continue at their low level, South America may
become a substantial outlet for Middle East crude which is
desperately looking for new outlets. The European market has
already undergone its major expansion and any future increases
will be probably be small. In fact, Aramco's share of the
European market may possible have a serious decline if Iranian
oil enters the world trade pattern under British control. The
exports to the Far East will probably not increase substantially.
This area is primarily supplied by the East Indies area and, in
addition, extensive exploration is being conducted in this area
which may enable it to become self-sufficient in its petroleum
supply. At present, the major exports to this area are in the
nature of refined products since there is relatively little
refinery capacity. The exports of crude oil to areas within
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the Middle East will depend mostly upon the degree of industrial
expansion that occurs within this area. Otherwise, there will
be relatively little refinery expansion because it is not
economically attractive, and the postwar refinery expansion
has taken place in other areas because of political factors and
the dollar gap problem. So, unless local governments make
additional refinery construction. a condition for obtaining or
holding petroleum concessions, this area should remain stable
or show only a slight increase. The unaccounted portion of the
graph is relatively small in relation to Ararnco's total nro-
duction. A substantial part of this region could probably be
accounted for in the losses that occur in transoortation and
also by the fact that Saudi Arabia and Aramco both use small
portions of the unrefined crude.
The only exports to North America. go either to the
United States or Canada. Canada, herself, has recently dis-
covered large amounts of oil and is now a net exporter of
petroleum. Its imports from Aramco have remained fairly constant
for the last three years and will probably decline as her own
production increases. Middle East exports into the United
States have become a very controversial subject within the
last two years. The imports from Saudi Arabia alone were
doubled from 1951 to 1952. The graph on the following rage
shows the 'monthly variations of Aramco imports from 1949 through
1952. In general, it shows a steady increase of the exports
to the United States, except for a short period in 1951, when
Aramco's oil went to other areas that were left oil-deficient
because of the Iranian nationalization. The heavy increase of
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U.S. imports in the last two years has been accomparried by
like increases from other foreign countries. This condition
has aoused some deep bitterness from domestic independent
producers and the coal industry. They are very much alarmed
over the possibility that foreign oil will supplant and not
just supplement domestic production. Because of this fear,
there is a definite possibility that Congress may pass more
stringent import tariffs to reduce tie amount of imports. In
an attempt to appease the coal industry and the independent
petroleum producers, the major companies will probably
voluntarily restrict their imports from the Middle East to
their present levels.
(75.)
APPENDIX
Conversion Factors
1 Barrel = 42 U. S. gallons
1 Metric Ton = 7.46 barrels (36* A.P.I. Gravity)
1 Long Ton = 7.58 barrels (36* A.P.I. Gravity)
1 Short Ton 6.77 barrels (36 A.P.I. Gravity)
Yearly Aramco Production*
Number of barrels
1936 -
1937 -
19,777
64,968
1938 - 495,135
1939 - 3,933,903
1940 - 5,074,838
1941 - 4,310,110
1942 - 4,530,492
1943 - 4,867,184
1944 - 7,794,420
1945 - 21,310,996
1946 - 59,943,996
1947 - 89,851,235
1948 - 142,853,000
1949 - 174,008,000
1950 - 199,547,000
1951 - 277,963,000
1952 - 302,571,000
* Source: Aramco, Annual Reports to the Saudi Arabian Government.
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Table V.
Crude Exports from Saudi Arabia (1946-1951) *
in thousands of barrels
TO 1946 1947 1948
Argentina 604 1,339 n.a.
Australia 0 0 0
Bahrein Island 25,951 36,663 39,752
Belgium 105 244 n.a.
Canada 0 0 1,70a
Canary Islands 247 760 n.a.
France 2,503 1,714 9,929
Indonesia 0 0 0
Israel 3,553 5,692 0
Italy 1,008 1,054 0
Japan Od Od Od
Netherlands 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 0
Sweden 087 751 1;436'
Union of South Africa 021 212 n.a.
United Kingdom 0 1,730 5,055a
United States Ob 623b 10,695b
Uruguay 107 221 933
West Germany 0 0 0
Yugoslavia 0 0 0
Known Exports 34,086 51,303 74,368
To Ras Ranura Refinery 29,297 39,065 43,450
To Sidon Refinery 0 0 0
TOTAL 63,383 90,368 117,818
Yearly Production 59,944 89,859 142,853
* The various sources are listed on page
Unaccounted 3,439 509 -25,035
Table V. (Continued)
Crude Exports from Saudi Arabia (1946-1951)
in thousands of barrels
TO
Argentina
Australia
Bahrein Island
Belgium
Canada
Canary Islands
France
Indonesia
Israel
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Union of South Africa
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
West German
Yugoslavia
1949 1950
0
0
45,348
353
7,949
n.a.
30, 1 9 9 a
134
0
n.a.d
151i
0
594
0
1,736
n.a.
6,400
12,460
645
7,852
0
Known Exports 113,821. 126,079 180,174
To Ras Tanura Refinery 46,3000 38,874c 58,1940
To Sidon Refinery Og 0669 1,080g
TOTAL 160,121 166,079 249,448
Yearly Production 1 7 4 , 0 0 8C 199,547 277,9630
-33,528 -28,515
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1951
0
182
46,287
n.a.
7,847
n.a.
23,838
0
15,767
2,v185
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2,296
n.a.
7,957
13,973
600
5,220
127
0
062
46,220
358
8,371
n.a.
32,955
0
26,073
n.a.
3 , 9 5 0 f
2,69 8f
2,545
650'
n.a.
29,605
16,161
841
9,571
114
-13,P887Unaccounted
(78.)
Sources: the exports that are unlettered were obtained from
the following publication:
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Mines, International Petroleum Trade, Vol. XV to XXII
(Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1946
to March 1953).
The other exports were obtained corresponding to the
lettered indications.
(a.) U.S. Department of Commerce, "World Trade in
Commodities," Petroleum and Coal, Vol, VII
and VIII (Washington: Government Printing Office,
February 1949 to August 1950).
(b.) U.S.-Department of Commerce by Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Imports of Merchandise for Con-
sumption, Report No. FT110, Monthly issues from
March 1946 to March 1953 (Washington: Government
Printing Office.)
(c.) Arabian American Oil Company, Annual 'Reports
to the Saudi Arabian Government (New York: Annual
issues from 1946 to 1951).
(d.) U.S. Department of Commerce-, Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, "International Trade
Statistics Series," Japanese Foreign Trade
(Washington: Government Printing Office, August
1952), p. 9.
(e.). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, "International Trdde
Statistics Series," Indonesian Foreign Trade
(Washington: Government Printing Office, July 1952),
p. 4.
(f.) United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs,
Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D. No. 10
(New York: United Nations, June 1952), p. 23.
(g.) "World Supply and Demand," World Oil, Vol. CXXXIV
(February 15, 1952), p. 258.
n.a. Not available
These excess exports over yearly production Isprobably due to errors in the varinus fi'ures
of the reporting countries.
Table -I.
Aramco Operations
1936 - 1947 in number of barrels
Production Consumption Runs to Exports to
B'h-rata n
Other Total
Sale a
Inventory,
Deceamber 31
19,777
64,968
495,135
3,933,903
5,074,838
4,310,110
4,530,492
4,868,184
7,794,420
21,310,996
59,943,766
89,851,646
19,077
65,668
28,503
38,821
58,042
30,847
73,986
8,817
32,386
80,876*
109,513
121,597**
700
104,397
392,924
350,774
3,452,363
29,297,101
39,065,060
455,754
2,957,955
4,313,262
4,055,790
4,429,719
4,819,674
7,146,335
15,676,815
25,951,218
36,662,750,
---- 455,754
457,758 3,415,713
840,390 5,153,652
---- 4,055,790
---- 4,429,719
7 4,819,681
---- 7,146,335
1,206,274 16,883,089
4,447,808 30,339,026
13,682,247 50,344,998
10,878
490,247
248,994
79,543
106,330
146,016
410,941
1,305,609
1,443,735
1,763,727
T0TAL 202,198,235 668,133 72,662,619 106,469,272 20,634,484 127,103,756
1936
1937
1938
1964
1940
1941
19423
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
-. 3 1
, )
Table VII.
lited States Imports of Crude Oil from Saudi Arabia*
1949 - 1952 in barrels
1950 1951 1952
Tanuary
February
krch
April
Tune
July
August
September
October
November
December
1,742, 612
2,446,899
1,254,025
1,031,656
1,074,414
1,154,719
848,748
711,806
219,824
624,719
627,369
723,146
1,483,229
687,204
1,307,635
1,217,594
1,125,856
985,499
1,213,804
1,185,046
863,308
1,498,991
641,285
1,763,343
1,760,277
1,098,108
1,152,384
1,851,729
2,028,384
1,578,144
2,403,900
1,481,415
1,485,454
890,116
204,333
226,922
931,992
1,722,611
1,736,635
1,815,508
2,036,754'
2,355,107
2,138,337
2,305,471
3,873,080
921,390
2,696,195
3,542,720
TrOTAL 12,459,937 13,972,794 16,161,166 27,075,800
CD)
* Source: Departrent of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U Imports of oMchandise f r Consumption,
Report No. FT 110, onthly issues froi March 1949 to %rch 1953 (Washington: Government
Printing Office).
1949
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